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[D]umb or bête, herb eater or carnivore, all animals that have eyes that can look into our 
eyes. It asks: What are you? And it is the same question as What am I? What do we do? We 
walk. We live through the day, day by day. We grow strong, and we grow weak. We pass 
through birth, but we never pass through death because there is nothing on the other side 
of death to pass into. Homo sapiens, Homo loquens, Homo bête. All the same. (Roberts 
284) 
 
These are the words of Graham Penhaligon, the main character of Adam Roberts’ futuristic novel Bête 
(2014), in which animals have been given the ability to speak through a microscopic brain chip. The 
novel takes place in a world where most humans have become vegetarians and wineglasses have the 
ability to remind you to hold back on the alcohol. The novel deals with questions of 
anthropomorphism and empathy and does so in an intricate and unique way, and this article aims to 
examine these aspects both separately and together. Theories of anthropomorphism and empathy are 
combined in the article in order to create an angle particularly aimed at examining Bête’s unique subject 
matter.  
I start the article with a characterization of Graham Penhaligon with emphasis on character 
development, as this aspect is especially important for the question of anthropomorphism, and 
anthropomorphism is the focus of the next part of the article. In this part, I will examine how Bête 
deals with anthropomorphism in a unique and intricate way. In the discussion, I will bring into question 
the topic of empathy by using Suzanne Keen’s theory on readers’ empathy and from this point I will 
examine how empathy relates to anthropomorphism. In this final part of the article, I examine a 
number of factors in the novel that both shed light on and complicate the question of empathy. 
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Through aspects of hierarchy, oppression, unappealing characters, consciousness, tragicomedy and 
contemporary political topics, the subjects of anthropomorphism and empathy become highly 
obscured in Bête. These aspects come to illustrate that man and animal are not that different and that 
readers’ empathy does not depend on any particular species or character trait. 
The main character of Bête, Graham Penhaligon, is a farmer who is decidedly against the idea of 
talking animals. At the novel’s starting point, Graham kills a so-called canny cow, a bête, although the 
cow begs him not to. Graham is a stubborn man who unremittingly fights the idea of bêtes through 
heavy use of sarcasm and with an impenetrable sense of logic, which keeps him believing that the 
bêtes’ ability to talk comes from clever programming only and not from true consciousness.  The cow 
tries to reason with Graham by explaining to him how consciousness works:  
 
‘There’s nothing magical or spiritual about consciousness, Graham,’ said the cow. ‘Any 
cortical architecture which can support learning and recall and which involves multiple, 
hierarchically organized loops of axonal projections converging on nodes out of which 
projections also diverge to the points of origin of convergence is functionally conscious.’ 
‘Grass, yum,’ I said. ‘Moo moo’. (Roberts 5) 
 
Although the bêtes are able to speak clearly and articulate concise and intellectual sentences, Graham’s 
piercing sarcasm aims at illustrating the opposite: he wishes to display the animals as dumb and expose 
their consciousness as fake. At this point, Graham is in anthropodenial; he refuses to acknowledge any 
kinds of human characteristics within animals and vice versa (de Waal 52). It seems, however, that 
although Graham outwardly tries to convince the reader (and himself) of his stance, he is not able to 
uphold the clear division he argues there is between man and animal. He provides the reader with clues 
that render him unreliable: “‘Oh, Mister Penhaligon,’ the cow said, sarcastically. We’ll have to assume, 
for the moment, that cows are capable of sarcasm” (Roberts 3). As a first person narrator, Graham 
has the ability to distort the story to his own advantage, and when he overtly applies a sarcastic voice 
to a cow he does not believe is capable of using sarcasm, he reveals to the reader that he cannot be 
trusted as a narrator.  
When Graham meets Anne, he crosses swords with her bête cat, Cincinnatus, who greatly gets 
on his nerves. At one point, Graham describes the cat as “rub[bing] itself like a pole dancer around 
the legs of the table” (69). According to Sowon Park, “social recognition depends on processes that 
are automatically put into place without our conscious awareness and that it is switched on all the time 
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whether we are aware of it or not” (9), which might indicate that Graham is ascribing human skills to 
Cincinnatus without truly being aware of what he is doing. Furthermore, he also does the opposite 
when he describes him and Anne having sex. Anne is making “owl-like hooting sounds” (Roberts 61), 
and Graham is “grunting like a bear, as men do” (61). These situations are important, as they are 
evidence that Graham’s anthropodenial is not as convincing as he would like it to be. Whether or not 
the application of human agency to Cincinnatus and the application of animal characteristics to himself 
and Anne are conscious or not, Graham is a character one has to observe meticulously as a reader, 
since he displays signs of unreliability while also undergoing tremendous development throughout the 
novel.  
The novel is divided into three parts – parts that are significant for understanding the 
development in Graham’s character. Part one is titled “Two legs in the morning” (1). As illustrated 
above, Graham is unyielding in his attitude towards animals in the novel’s first part, although his tone 
of voice and actions often tell the reader otherwise. The meaning of “two legs” can be interpreted as 
Graham’s starting point as one-hundred percent human. Whether or not this interpretation is accurate 
is debatable, however. This is a point I will return to. Through part one of the novel, Graham gradually 
becomes more inclined to accept the idea of true consciousness in the bêtes: “I remembered what 
Cincinnatus had told me (….) the bêtes were living creatures, with conscious minds. Not conscious to 
a very advanced level, of course (…) Much of what the cat said to me was computer, but maybe some 
of it was echt cat” (107). Furthermore, Graham is forced to live in the woods and begins to refer to 
himself as “an animal in the wild” (140), because he is solely focused on survival and finding food.  
 Part two of the novel is titled “Three legs in the afternoon” (225), and quite literally refers to 
Graham’s appearance when he suffers an injury to his leg: “And so it was that I stomped off leaning 
on a walking stick for every swing of my left leg, like an old geezer. Three-legged man” (228). At this 
point, Graham lives in the woods and appears to have become a kind of fusion of man and animal. 
He is three-legged; somehow neither man nor animal, but he still refers to himself as a man. Graham 
continuously refuses to be called by his name. He consistently responds with “don’t call me Graham” 
(7), when other characters – humans as well as bêtes – call him Graham. It remains unclear why no 
one besides his wife and mom are allowed to call him Graham, but when Cincinnatus introduces the 
idea of giving Graham access to his mind and thereby to his memories of Anne, he suddenly changes 
his mind: “‘You can call me Graham,’ I told the cat” (229). At this point, it is clear that Graham 
gradually begins to give up the strong boundaries he has upheld between himself and the bêtes.  
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The final part of the novel is titled “four legs in the evening” (287) and represents the final stage 
in Graham’s development: “The homo sapiens was laid out on the table, and he was dead. His skin 
was white as lard. His name had been Graham Penhaligon, but he didn’t have a name now, because 
names are uniquely properties of the living” (289). It is unclear what precisely has happened to Graham 
at this point in the novel, but the position of the narrator shifts and the reader is told that “[s]ome 
come to bêteness by chance, devouring a chip inadvertently in the course of feeding. Others are 
selected. I was the latter. Except that I am not yet. She is still vixen” (291). If the lines between man 
and animal were blurred before, they have now become further obscured and impossible to distinguish. 
At this final stage, it appears that man has become animal, and animal has become man. Graham has 
vanished and the vixen emerges. 
Anthropomorphism is naturally very much in focus in Bête. Anthropomorphism is the attribution of 
human characteristics to something non-human such as an animal. The contrasts between man and 
animal are highly obscured in the novel, and this is of course mainly because bêtes have the ability to 
speak. Speech is often used to illustrate differences between humans and animals, and the ability is 
under tremendous discussion throughout the novel. The characters spend a lot of time discussing 
whether the ability should exist at all, but also whether or not the chip is able to translate the true 
consciousness of the animals into speech or if the speech is solely computer-driven. The brain-chip 
grows into the brain tissue and cannot be removed without killing the bête that occupies it (Roberts 
7), which naturally becomes cause for complication when the bêtes turn into a threat.  
Within studies of anthropomorphism, one question that is greatly debated is whether animal and 
man should be seen as binaries or through a spectrum of more overlapping and inconclusive 
boundaries. Sam Cadman argues the latter and claims that a spectrum  
 
may provide important insights not only into how anthropocentric values are propagated 
in fictional forms commonly accepted as benign, indeed as promoting empathy towards 
other species, but also how creative practitioners may self-reflexively employ fictional 
animals as a means of promoting post-anthropocentric consciousness and species 
plurality. (162-63) 
 
The idea of a spectrum is particularly important for Roberts’ novel, because a new species emerges, 
which carries traits from both humans and animals. The cow that Graham kills in the beginning recalls:  
“I remember what it was like before. What I was like. My upgrade contains within it large amounts of 
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data, including complete files on the organization that implanted it” (Roberts 5). The word “upgrade” 
is especially noteworthy here, as the wording suggests that the bête cow is now more highly ranked 
than animals that have not been given the ability to speak. This notion is further substantiated by the 
fact that the animals without speech abilities are referred to as “dumb” (38). This distinction creates a 
hierarchy between the animals, a hierarchy that arguably creates a considerable discrepancy between 
‘dumb’ animals and bêtes. Although the ‘upgrade’ appears to be an advantage for the bêtes, it is 
thought-provoking to consider what it means for the animals that are not granted speech. Would you 
think of a certain animal as dumb if there were not an upgraded animal with the ability to speak to 
compare it with? An argument can be made for the fact that the emergence of bêtes places the ‘dumb’ 
animals lower in the hierarchy than they would have been before this significant revolution. Their place 
in society is weakened and this is further corroborated by the fact that the killing of bêtes becomes 
illegal. Giving the bêtes the ability to speak naturally makes them more human-like, which is arguably 
why they become illegal to kill. However, it does add to the decline in the position of ‘dumb’ animals, 
because their privileges (or lack thereof) can be compared to the privileges of the bêtes. Of course, the 
‘dumb’ animals are not able to communicate this issue and it is left unsaid what consequences this 
creates for them. 
The reader is not told specifically who has made the decision to put chips in certain animals. A 
choice however, has been made about what kinds of animals should get this new privilege: “The move 
to grant animals ‘rights’ had been building for decades. Not all animals: not the cholera bacillus, or the 
hagworm or the mosquito of course. But the fluffy ones. The pretty ones. Kittens and baby seals and 
the like” (24). This also points towards a hierarchy within the animal kingdom of Bête. The fact that 
someone has made a choice about which animals deserve the right to speak is somewhat absurd, and, as 
it turns out, ends up backfiring on the humans when war erupts. As Graham’s friend Preacherman 
argues, “[i]f we’d stopped at giving the ruminants speech it would have been fine. But giving the 
predators speech – that was asking for trouble” (27-28). This blending of races and overlap of character 
traits show that in Bête, man and animal cannot be seen as simply a binary opposition, but are part of 
the complicated spectrum that Cadman describes, which makes a clear-cut distinction between the two 
virtually impossible.  
When it comes to the discussion of consciousness in the bêtes, it is important to consider how 
they differentiate themselves from humans and how they are similar. For example, when Graham talks 
to a pig, it claims that bêtes “have not acquired that human skill – the ability to lie” (48). This claim 
along with Graham’s application of sarcasm to a cow’s voice are examples of possible differences 
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between humans and bêtes. These examples suggest that the bêtes are more innocent and virtuous 
than humans – lying and being sarcastic are not options for them. This notion points back to a central 
idea in Gulliver’s Travels, which John Simons uses as an example in his book on animal rights. He 
emphasizes that the so-called Houyhmhms were “far superior, both functionally and morally, to the 
slippery and duplicitous languages of humans” (Simons 134). The idea of a morally superior race is 
also applicable to Bête, but becomes complicated by the war that emerges between bêtes and humans, 
because the bêtes mirror human war strategies to win. In a way, the integrity of the bêtes becomes 
tainted when they begin to imitate human behavior.  
 The war entails a series of paradoxes in the novel and questions of oppression and hierarchy 
are especially significant in this regard.  As Preacherman argues: “‘It’s not them! The dumb animals are 
the ones you should feel guilty about killing. They’re innocent! It’s the ones with chips we should be 
killing. They’re the devil! The software algorithms are using these various animals as tools, as cat’s-
paws, that’s all. And they’re wielding them for the devil’” ( Roberts 38). Preacherman believes that the 
bêtes have taken control over the entire animal kingdom, and thus have become the superior animal 
race.  
The bêtes become a substantial threat to humanity when war emerges. But exactly what do the 
bêtes want and why? Graham points to the fact that “[m]ost humans, for most of human history, have 
not loved animals (…) They have loved eating animals. They have loved hunting, killing and butchering 
animals. It’s difficult to see how the animals, now they were learning to talk, would be anything other 
than annoyed by this deep history” (45). When the issue of animal exploitation is set up in this manner, 
the ability to speak seems like a small and insignificant way for the humans to apologize for their 
mistakes. Although it is mere speculation to consider the speaking abilities of the bêtes as an apology, 
this interpretation paves the way for some interesting aspects. When discussing animals with regard to 
oppression, a well-known analogy is the genocide of World War II. This is because “[t]he history of 
oppression has always been marked by arguments that the oppressed are not worthy of consideration 
because they do not possess fully human characteristics or, to put it baldly, are more like animals than 
humans” (Simons 129). In the world of Bête, an oppressed species has obtained a quality that is so 
connected to the idea of humanity that this argument of oppression cannot be applied. However, it is 
questionable if speech is enough to keep the bêtes from being oppressed and whether it helps them 
become legitimate citizens.    
Bête citizenship is discussed on multiple levels in the novel. In the news, it is debated how to 
best integrate the bêtes into society: “Once the canny beasts are granted full citizenship they can be 
Jane Kannegård Ladefoged  55 
 
taxed! Why deny the contribution they can make to European productivity? Here is the key to a renewal 
of prosperity: instead of treating them like second class citizens, integrate them fully into society” 
(Roberts 88). Whether taxation would benefit the bêtes is highly questionable. It is possible to argue 
that the idea builds on equality and could help obstruct part of the aforementioned hierarchy, bringing 
the rights of bêtes closer to the rights of humans. However, more than anything else, it appears to be 
a purely economic and egocentric measure that benefits man only. Taxation functions as a new way 
for the humans to exploit animals.  
The idea of bête citizenship does not last for long. Graham points out: “‘last year we were 
thinking of making bêtes citizens and now we’re burning bêtes in big pyres all across Northumberland.’ 
‘Because humans so are scrupulous about not killing other humans, you mean?’ miaowed the cat 
smugly. ‘Because citizenship is the infallible protection about being shot, bombed, gassed or burnt to 
death?’” (187). With citizenship comes the risk of being killed by other citizens, which essentially leaves 
the bêtes in the same – or perhaps even a worse – societal position than before bêteness. Being at war 
with humans is no desired position to be in. 
The previously mentioned paradoxes of Bête appear multiple times in the novel, both in relation 
to speech abilities and with regard to war. Preacherman argues: 
 
‘I told them people would get fed up with listening to animals talking of nothing but Green 
propaganda. You know what they said to me? They said: why, what else would the animals 
say to humankind, Preacherman? You think maybe they would speak words of kindness 
for our hundreds of thousands of years of exploitation and slaughter? Of course they’re 
angry! We’re just giving them a voice to voice their anger’. (26) 
 
The bêtes are quite literally ready to talk, but the question is whether the humans are ready to listen to 
the bêtes and thus be confronted with the mistakes they have made in the past. Numerous factors 
indicate that humans have regrets about the brain chips. The bêtes not only confront humans about 
thousands of years of exploitation, but also become a substantive threat to human life. The bêtes are 
able to communicate with each other through a shared WiFi-based consciousness, and this is 
something that Graham comes to experience. His killing of the bête cow thus comes to all of the bêtes 
attention, which makes him ponder: “[o]f course they knew who I was. It dawned belatedly on me, 
standing there, that – like Anne’s cat – all these cows had read my piece. That they probably regarded 
me as a murderer. Awkward. But then again: fuck it” (79). This shared consciousness gives the bêtes a 
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substantial advantage in the war with their enemy. Furthermore, “they are using the tactics humans 
have used since the first armies were conscripted. They’re raiding, destroying what they can, killing 
people” (187). The bêtes’ use of human war tactics against the humans is deeply ironic and proof that 
man unintentionally has created a highly advanced enemy. As Mary, a woman who gives Graham 
shelter, points out, “[w]hen you think what our kind has done to the natural world,’ she said, in a gloomy 
voice. ‘Why should we expect mercy from them?” (207). It is curious to think about what kind of 
reaction the humans had anticipated from the bêtes when implanting them with chips. As implied by 
Mary, it is not surprising and even understandable if the bêtes seek some sort of revenge.  
The subject of empathy is essential for Bête, wherefore I will utilize Suzanne Keen’s theory on 
readers’ empathy in the following section. Keen argues that “empathy for fictional characters may 
require only minimal elements of identity, situation, and feeling, not necessarily complex or realistic 
characterization” (69). This is an important point with regard to Bête, because the novel takes place in 
a futuristic world and is about a species that does not exist in real life. It goes without saying that 
readers’ empathy is subjective and is influenced by a number of factors, which are difficult to control 
for both author and reader.  However, it is still important and intriguing to consider different aspects 
of empathy in Bête, because the novel deals with the topic in an intricate and extraordinary way. When 
we consider the aforementioned topic of oppression, it is certainly relevant to look at the differences 
between man and bête. Although one might initially presume that readers tend to feel more empathy 
with other humans than say, a talking animal,  
 
a strong pattern emerges supporting the notion that character identification lies at the 
heart of readers’ empathy. These characters need not be human (…) This suggests that 
character identification and empathy felt for fictional characters requires certain traits 
(such as name, a recognizable situation, and at least implicit feelings) but dispenses with 
other requirements associated with realistic representation. (Keen 68) 
 
It is essential for Bête that the species of a character is not important for the feeling of empathy. Some 
of the bêtes have names and they are able to express their feelings through speech, which, according 
to Keen, is enough to lay the groundwork for empathetic reading. Keen also suggests that “many 
readers report that novels in which child characters are subjected to cruel or unfair treatment evoke 
empathy” (69). I argue that it is possible to make a connection between children and animals in this 
regard. Children and animals are both generally viewed as innocent creatures and often rendered more 
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or less defenseless. Therefore, fictional animals, generally speaking, can also appeal to the empathy of 
a reader. The bêtes, of course, are not animals as we know them. Graham believes that the bêtes are 
the result of a strategy meant to stop people from eating meat, which is a curious thought with regard 
to empathy. Is the ability of speech empathy-evoking? Speech certainly gives the bêtes agency, which 
Keen also argues is important in creating character identification (68). It is debatable whether speech 
is an advantage or a disadvantage for the bêtes when it comes to empathy. They are able to stand up 
for themselves and argue intelligently with the humans: “‘I know what I feel the same way you know 
what you feel,’ said the cat. ‘My consciousness is blended machine and animal brain. Yours is like mine, 
but less. How can you be sure that what you’re feeling is genuine? How to stand outside oneself?’” 
(Roberts 102). The intelligence of the bêtes can be seen as an advantage in the way that they can argue 
their viewpoints and defend themselves. However, Cincinnatus’ cunning and sarcastic manner often 
puts him in a dangerous position, because Graham is provoked by it. In fact, the speech ability ends 
up being an argument for the humans to justify killing the bêtes.  
One could ask the question: which characters does the reader feel empathy for in Bête? As 
mentioned, empathy will undoubtedly vary from reader to reader, but one aspect that is often 
mentioned with regard to readers’ empathy is narration (Keen 93). Roberts uses first person narration, 
which naturally brings the reader closer to the character from whose perspective the story unfolds. 
First person narration is often strongly connected to empathy, because the ability to see inside the 
mind of the character makes them easier to understand and their actions easier to follow. However, as 
the first part of my analysis showed, Graham shows signs of unreliability while also possessing 
character traits that are not very sympathetic. He is stubborn, sarcastic and treats the people and bêtes 
around him badly. How then, does this closeness to an unlikeable character affect readers’ empathy? 
“The phenomenon of empathy for unattractive characters actually strengthens the case for the idea of 
minimal requirements for identification”, Keen argues (75-76). We need only to find a fraction of 
Graham’s personality appealing in order to empathize with him. Aside from his problematic character 
traits, Graham also addresses the reader directly in a very coarse way: “You think I killed that cow like 
a hunter? I killed it out of my own stubbornness and wrath. You dislike me for killing it. You’re no 
vegetarian, though, hypocrite, reader, my image. My friend” (Roberts 9). Calling the reader a hypocrite 
is bold and insulting, and thus develops the risk of alienating the reader. At the same time however, 
Graham is self-conscious of his issues. He knows that he is stubborn; he knows that he is bitter, and 
he openly shares this with the reader. This could help him in winning the reader over, because he 
demonstrates self-awareness. Keen argues that characterization “such as naming, description, indirect 
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implication of traits, reliance on types, relative flatness or roundness, depicted actions, roles in plot 
trajectories, quality of attributed speech, and mode of representation of consciousness, may be 
assumed to contribute to the potential for character identification and thus for empathy” (93). 
Graham’s self-awareness demonstrates roundness in character, and his sarcasm and use of humor 
might soften the readers’ impression of him. If the reader likes his coarse humor and nothing else, this 
is enough to establish empathy.  
Bête deals with issues such as vegetarianism and examines what the future might hold. These 
topics are under ample discussion in international politics today and are often the cause of great 
controversy and debate. Choosing such topics for a novel risks further alienating the reader: “Negative 
factors such as prejudice, bias, impatience with a particular literary style, or feeling rushed or pressured 
might also account for unresponsive reading” (72), Keen mentions. Some elements of Bête, 
vegetarianism for example, might cause the reader to feel pressured to respond in a certain way, but as 
established, the novel gives no right or wrong answer to the sensitive questions it poses. Its main topics 
are intricately portrayed and different characters illustrate different beliefs, which augments the ways 
in which the reader can or will feel empathy. The intricacy of the questions also makes it challenging 
to unveil what viewpoints are considered to be ‘correct’ by the implied author (73). Readers must 
decide for themselves what they consider the right interpretation. 
Humor and irony play a big role in the novel, and it is not only seen in Graham’s behavior. 
Multiple absurd scenarios unfold in the novel, for example when Preacherman and Graham talk about 
the bête war:   
 
 ‘when you go into combat against other human beings, you have to – you know. The 
problem is you have to kill human beings.’ ‘I would have thought that was rather the point.’ 
‘Ah, but fighting bêtes is different, you see. The troops get markedly less PTSD’ed by 
gunning down cows and dogs.’ (…) ‘You scorch down the enemy with your modern 
weapons, and a lot of them burn, and there’s this stench of burning human flesh, which 
is apparently really unsettling and disturbing. But fighting the bêtes? Burn them up and it 
just smells like a barbecue’. (Roberts 253-54) 
 
This scene is so absurd that one feels compelled to laugh, but at the same time a certain logic 
characterizes it – it makes sense that killing an animal does not provoke PTSD in the same way as 
killing humans does and it also makes sense that burning animals smell like food. However, the 
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situation becomes more tragic than comical when one remembers that the bêtes are informed and 
articulating creatures. This tragicomic interchangeability creates a turbulence of feelings within the 
reader that is not easily controlled or understood.  Empathy comes and goes throughout the novel and 
shifts as the characters develop and change. This arguably makes the novel appeal broadly, because the 
different shifts throughout the story make it possible to establish readers’ empathy in multiple ways. 
Within the study of anthropomorphism, one question is central: can anthropomorphic fiction 
tell us anything about what it is like to be an animal? Thomas Nagel’s paper “What is it like to be a 
bat?” is often used to discuss this issue. In his paper, Nagel discusses to which extent it is possible for 
humans to understand what it is like to be a bat. Derek Ryan explains: 
 
Nagel conceives of this kind of knowledge of the animal’s experience as a sliding scale 
where the ‘distance between oneself and other persons and other species can fall anywhere 
on a continuum’. Humans have their place on this scale, where we cannot, strictly 
speaking, know what it is like to be another human (even though we may know what it is 
like for us to act like another human) (…) When we take into account the multiplicity of 
differences between species as well as within species, the difficulty of the task is furthered. 
(38) 
 
With this in mind, one could ask what the difference is between trying to put oneself in another 
person’s place and in an animal’s place. Is there a limit to what a writer can and should do in this regard? 
Bête highly blurres the lines between what is animalistic and what is not and with this, the idea of literary 
characters also becomes obscured. The use of speech in the novel creates a complication, because 
bêtes and humans become difficult to distinguish from each other. The medium contributes highly to 
this complication. We naturally cannot see the characters; we use our imagination to create images of 
how they might look. But when a non-human character is given a feature that is so profoundly 
connected to humanity, it is possible to forget – even if for a moment – that the talking character is 
not human. Thus, when a cow says: “This actual world of what is knowable, in which we are and which 
is in us, remains both the material and the limit of our consideration” (Roberts 44), the phrase functions 
on more than one level. It creates a paradox in the representation of a non-human character through 
direct speech, but it also illustrates what one might refer to as unknowability (Park 11) – the ever-
present fact that we can never know how other species experience the world.   
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What then, does Bête tell us about being human and being an animal and in which ways? 
Arguably, besides examining the differences between animal and man, the novel also explores what it 
means to be human. As previously mentioned, Graham physically comes to resemble an animal more 
and more throughout the story. His inner character, however, seems to move in a different direction:    
 
Graham seems to become softer and more human. His love for Anne, and his eventual 
pact with animal-tribe leader The Lamb gives the reader hope that Graham might finally 
view the animal kingdom as more than a source of income, or as ‘dumb’ pets. Is what 
Roberts is getting at here, then, the theme of tolerance, and the idea that each human and 
indeed each animal is different, and as such will lead their lives in a different way? (Rogers, 
“Language and Ethics…”) 
 
In this interpretation, there seems to be a distinction between what it means to be human and what it 
means to be humane. Graham softens his view on bêtes and ends up becoming non-human but 
increasingly humane. As previously mentioned, Graham applies human characteristics to animals and 
vice versa, although he contends that animals and humans should not and cannot be compared. This 
barrier is slowly erased throughout the novel and thus, as Graham becomes increasingly animalistic in 
character, the more conscious he becomes of the intricate connections between humans and animals. 
Graham’s true consciousness surfaces.  
John Simons distinguishes between fables, trivial anthropomorphism and strong 
anthropomorphism. According to his definitions, Bête qualifies as representing the latter: 
 
Strong anthropomorphism is a category of representation which deals with animals as if 
they were humans but does it in such a way as either to show how the non-human 
experience differs from the human or to create profound questions in the readers’ mind 
as to the extent to which humans and non-humans are really different. (120) 
 
The complicated spectrum of species in the novel inarguably makes one consider the differences and 
similarities between humans, animals and bêtes. The bêtes are unlike ‘normal’ animals but also unlike 
humans, so the question is whether they are supposed to tell us something about being an animal or 
something about being human. Perhaps the answer is that they tell us something about both. The 
question of unknowability emerges when we consider whether a human author can tell us something 
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about what it is like to be a bat (or a bête). However, the question of unknowability is similar when, 
for instance, a female author writes from the perspective of a man or the other way around. 
Interestingly, realism is not what is not what is central to anthropomorphic fiction (Cadman 174) and 
as previously illustrated, realistic characterization is not necessary for readers’ empathy either. Set in a 
futuristic and bizarre world, Bête makes the reader think deeply about both the inner lives of animals 
and empathy. Although most researchers of anthropomorphism agree that humans cannot know what 
it is like to be an animal, Bête forces us to try. The fact that we do not know should never keep us from 
trying: “What we don’t know about animals and what we get wrong about animals have great 
significance in their own right as something separate from securing ultimate certainty, for the process 
of extended scrutiny and investigation is in itself a political and ethical bridge” (Park 13). The novel 
can be seen as a critique of human greed and selfishness. It shows us what happens when humans take 
advantage of animals and use them for their own benefits. That is, until they regret this decision and 
realize that a strong and possibly vindictive species threatens humanity. Moreover, the novel also builds 
on the idea of unknowability in the way it examines consciousness.  Perhaps the fact that we do not 
know and presumably cannot ever know how animals feel and why they behave the way they do should 
be enough knowledge to treat them like we (should) treat humans – with respect and empathy: “Homo 
sapiens, Homo loquens, Homo bête. All the same” (Roberts 284). 
 
In this article, I have examined Adam Roberts’ Bête through the lens of anthropomorphism and 
empathy. I began by characterizing the main character, Graham, and found that he starts out as an 
incredibly stubborn and arrogant character, who shows signs of unreliability. However, he undergoes 
great development over the course of the novel. This development brings into question what it means 
to be human, what it means to be animal and shows how these two are more connected than one 
might assume.  The complicated spectrum of species in Bête creates different forms of hierarchy. 
Humans have chosen which animals should be given the ability to speak. The ones chosen, the bêtes, 
become illegal to kill – but only until they pose a threat to humanity and a war must be fought. 
Meanwhile, the ‘dumb’ animals remain legal to prey on. The bête war entails questions of oppression 
and revenge. After years of exploitation and killings, the bêtes are angry – and they now have an actual 
voice to declare this anger with.  
The topic of readers’ empathy is established on multiple levels but also becomes obscured along 
the way. The reader is inside the head of Graham, an unappealing character, which simultaneously 
makes us understand him and dislike him – empathy comes and goes. The current topics of 
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vegetarianism and dread of the future can both engage the reader but also risks alienation through 
didacticisms. Through the use of tragicomedy, multiple absurd scenarios play out in the novel, which 
places the reader in a position where it is difficult to find the right response and perhaps this is because 
there is no right response. When the burning of bêtes is described as smelling like a barbecue, it is 
difficult not to laugh, but also difficult not to ponder over the immorality of the scene.  One thing is 
for sure, Bête is an expression of strong anthropomorphism. It makes us consider what it is like to be 
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